Rumsfeld vs the generals

Colonel Mark F. Cancian, U.S. Marine Corps Reserve (Ret.), writing in the United States Naval Institute's magazine Proceedings, takes a close look at Iraq war planning - as registration is required, the excerpt that follows is longer than usual:

Rumsfeld, like McNamara, also intervened actively in operational planning. He scrapped the existing deployment plan and substituted a process whereby Central Command would request specific units (through a "request for forces" or RFF), and the Secretary would approve them through a deployment order. Where he thought forces were excessive or imbalanced, he pressed Central Command and the services to justify the request. If unconvinced, he did not approve the force package. The notion thus has grown that Rumsfeld ignored military advice and substituted his own plan.

The problem is that, according to the military participants, this is not true. General Tommy Franks, who was Commander, Central Command, and the officer ultimately responsible for operations, states forcefully in his autobiography that he drove prewar planning and supported the result. He is proud of producing what he sees as an innovative plan based on jointness and "new operational and strategic paradigms"— speed and mass of effect. He believes prewar exercises "validated" the plan and its assumptions. Finally, he describes briefing all the service chiefs and getting their approval. He does describe repeated discussions with Rumsfeld as the planning evolved, but sees this as the appropriate interaction of a commander with his civilian leaders.

General Richard Myers, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, has been emphatic that "there has never been a better exchange of viewpoints between senior military and civilians as occurs today at the Pentagon." He repeatedly has denied that before the war senior military leaders advised against military action. Further, he dismissed as "absolute rubbish" accusations that civilians had ignored military advice.

Indeed, none of the military commanders involved has come forward to say he disagreed with the final plan. Apparently, they had the opportunity. As Daniel Goure, a Pentagon adviser, relates:

On the morning of March 13, six days before the first coalition air strikes on Baghdad, Donald Rumsfeld attended a crucial war meeting. "It was detailed stuff, and there was not a word of dissent from anyone in that room," said Daniel Goure, who attended the meeting. "Not from anyone. And remember the whole armchair-general crowd was there. No one said: 'Are you sure you've got enough troops?' Everyone was on board with the plan."15

The conclusion is inescapable: Franks and Rumsfeld—indeed the entire military and civilian leadership — were in this together. You cannot criticize one without criticizing the other.

It's a no nonsense article that demolishes a number of Iraq war "truths". It's worth the registration hassle, read it.